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Regulation A-Plus’s Identity Crisis
A ONE-SIZE-FITS-NONE APPROACH TO CAPITAL
FORMATION
INTRODUCTION
Regulation A-Plus, designed as a replacement for the
failed Regulation A, was supposed to increase capital market
liquidity and spur economic growth. The Regulation, however,
does little to address the needs of the very companies it was
crafted to help. This failure is rooted in the statute that created
Regulation A-Plus, the JOBS Act.
Congress enacted the JOBS Act in 2012 for the express
purpose of increasing access to capital and promoting business
growth.1 Noting the important role of small and emerging growth
companies in promoting job growth, the JOBS Act contained
several provisions aimed at easing restrictions on capital
formation.2 Title IV Section 401 of the JOBS Act mandated a
revision to the rarely used Regulation A.3 The new rule, dubbed
Regulation A-Plus, sought to provide companies with a new capital
raising mechanism.4 Unfortunately, Regulation A-Plus suffers from
many of the same deficiencies as its predecessor, such as a high
cost of capital and time-consuming application process.
Rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all solution for small
and emerging growth companies—two classes of companies with
different needs and concerns—the SEC should create
fundraising mechanisms that address the individual concerns of
both types of companies.
Part I of this note discusses the legislative history of the
JOBS Act and describes Regulations A and A-Plus. It posits
1 See Luis A. Aguilar, Making Capital Formation Work for Smaller
Companies and Investors, SEC (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/
aguilar-regulation-crowdfunding-147-504.html [https://perma.cc/TWR3-ULVU].
2 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
3 Id. § 401; see Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller
Companies’ Access to Capital: New Rules Provide Investors with More Investment
Choices (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html [https://
perma.cc/3R58-QFLH].
4 See Press Release, SEC, supra note 3.
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that, rather than remedying the flaws in Regulation A,
Regulation A-Plus attempts to address new problems facing a
different class of company. This is reflected in the structure
and intent of Regulation A-Plus, as well as its position in the
wider regulatory landscape.
Part II considers two characteristics of Regulation A-Plus
that may ultimately increase access to capital: the preemption of
state blue sky laws and the relaxation of the ban on general
solicitation. State blue sky laws, which represent a second level
of regulation, require issuers to register securities with state
agencies before sale within the territorial bounds of that state.5
Relaxing the ban on general solicitation will permit companies
to “test the waters” by gauging investor interest before
completing the long and costly Regulation A-Plus process. This
part weighs the concerns associated with both the preemption of
state blue sky laws and the relaxation on general solicitation,
and ultimately concludes that these provisions are desirable and
indeed should be expanded.
Part III examines the impact of Regulation A-Plus on both
small businesses and emerging growth companies. It
demonstrates that small businesses will not be helped by
Regulation A-Plus, and proposes several reforms that might
remedy this problem. Specifically, it suggests reducing the total,
rather than average, cost of capital through various means.
Having established how Regulation A-Plus could be successfully
applied to small companies, this part considers the dangers facing
emerging growth companies and suggests appropriate reforms.
Based on these findings, this note concludes by suggesting:
(1) an expansion of state blue sky law preemption; (2) an expansion
and clarification of the rules governing general solicitation; (3) a
renewed focus on small businesses; (4) a reduction in the limits on
Regulation A-Plus funding so as to make Regulation A-Plus less
attractive as an alternative to low-end IPOs; and (5) a
streamlining of the filing process. These changes will increase the
attractiveness of Regulation A-Plus to small businesses, providing
an additional, cost-effective, means of raising capital.
5 See, e.g., Brandon F. White & Andrew J. Palid, The Rise of the Massachusetts
Uniform Securities Act, 94 MASS. L. REV. 117, 118 (2013); see also Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1917) (describing the origins of state blue sky laws).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. From Financial Crisis to JOBS Act
In 2012, following a financial crisis that rocked the world
economy, Congress passed the JOBS Act.6 Among its many
goals, the JOBS Act sought to alleviate a credit crunch many
commentators blamed for America’s sluggish economic recovery.7
Usually, when a company seeking to raise capital sells stock to
the public, the shares must be registered with the relevant state
and federal authorities.8 Several exemptions exist to this general
rule,9 and Title IV of the JOBS Act instructed the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to rewrite one such exemption—
Regulation A.10 The result, published in the Federal Register in
early 2015, would come to be known as Regulation A-Plus.11 The
decision to update Regulation A, and the one-size-fits-none
result, is directly traceable to the intentions and shortcomings of
the JOBS Act itself. This section will place the JOBS Act in its
relevant historical context. It will then analyze Title IV of the
JOBS Act and discuss the intentions of its drafters.
The JOBS Act was enacted against the backdrop of the
global financial crisis, which began with the collapse of the
subprime housing market in August of 2007.12 In the preceding
years, banks and large financial institutions had increasingly
tied their financial fate to the subprime housing market.13 As a
result, the subprime housing crisis quickly spread to America’s
major financial institutions and by September 2008, the
banking giant Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehmans)
6 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
at 306; see also Lori Schock, Dir., Office of Inv’r Educ. & Advocacy, Speech at InvestEd
2012: Outline of Dodd-Frank Act and JOBS Act (June 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171490596 [https://perma.cc/G4TL-QTWV].
7 See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S.,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 340 (2011).
8 I WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS § 1:02
(rev. ed. 1994).
9 Id. § 1:03.
10 See infra Section I.D.
11 See Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the
Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,806 (Apr. 20, 2015).
12 See Schock, supra note 6. Arguably, the seeds of the financial crisis were
planted long before the housing market collapsed. However, for the purposes of this
note, the more conventional starting point will be accepted. See INT’LMONETARY FUND,
WORLDECONOMICOUTLOOK: CRISIS ANDRECOVERY 2 (2009), http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RDG-ZJY2] [hereinafter IMF, CRISIS
ANDRECOVERY].
13 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-
still-being-felt-five-years-article [https://perma.cc/ZU39-CC4N].
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collapsed.14 Founded in 1850, Lehmans was one of the oldest
investment banks in the country.15 By 2008 Lehmans, having
survived every financial crisis and downturn it had previously
encountered, was the nation’s fourth-largest investment bank.16
Its eventual bankruptcy filing remains the largest in U.S.
history, with the cost of administration almost $1 billion as of
2010.17 The damage was not limited to Lehmans itself; the day
the company entered bankruptcy, the Dow dropped over 500
points wiping out “$700 billion in value from retirement plans,
government pension funds, and other investment portfolios.”18
In the aftermath, credit dried up and companies in every line of
business found themselves without access to capital.19
This was the start of what former Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke later described as “the worst financial
crisis in global history.”20 In describing the need for subsequent
intervention, Mr. Bernanke would note that following the demise
of Lehmans, 12 “[o]f the 13 ‘most important financial institutions
in the United States . . . were at risk of failure within a period of a
week or two.’”21 Former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner recalled
the economy as being “in free fall.”22 In an attempt to halt the
spread of the crisis, the government embarked on a massive
bailout of struggling financial institutions.23
This was not the first financial crisis to befall the
Western economies. In the past, lawmakers responded to
banking failures by enacting laws and creating agencies to curb
economic excess and maintain public confidence in the nation’s
financial systems.24 The initial reaction to the 2008 crisis was no
14 Id.
15 See Case Study: The Collapse of Lehman Brothers, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.
investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/lehman-brothers-collapse.asp [https://perma.cc/NYF
3-U2ZA] (last updated Feb. 16, 2017).
16 Id.
17 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S.,
supra note 7, at 340.
18 Id. at 339.
19 Id.
20 Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, Bernanke: 2008 Meltdown Was Worse than Great
Depression, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/08/26/2008-
meltdown-was-worse-than-great-depression-bernanke-says [https://perma.cc/2C8M-GGHT].
21 Id. (quoting Ben Bernanke, former Federal Reserve Chairman).
22 Id. (quoting Timothy Geithner, former Treasury Secretary).
23 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, supra note 13; see
also IMF, CRISIS AND RECOVERY, supra note 12, at 2 (commenting on the need for swift
and effective government intervention to prevent a total economic collapse).
24 The Federal Reserve Bank, for example, was created in the wake of the
nearly catastrophic financial crises of 1907, while the Glass-Steagall Act and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which established the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the SEC, were passed in reaction to the Great Depression. See
The Slumps that Shaped Modern Finance, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/
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different.25 After the stimulus had stabilized America’s banks
and financial institutions, economists turned their attention to
limiting long-term systemic risk and preventing future crises.
Kenneth Rogoff, professor of economics and public policy at
Harvard, described the $790 billion stimulus package as
“giving a blood transfusion while the patient is still bleeding”
and argued that “[i]f we’re not going to fix the banking system at
the same time, then it’s just a temporary boost in the
economy.”26 Other economists warned of a Japanese style L-
Shaped recovery—where economic decline is followed by a period
of relative stability rather than the desired period of economic
growth—unless additional measures were taken.27 In 2009,
President Obama issued a press release declaring the need “to
build a new foundation for sustained economic growth.”28 The
President called for “strong, vibrant financial markets, operating
under transparent, fairly-administered rules of the road that
protect America’s consumers and our economy from the
devastating breakdown that we’ve witnessed in recent years.”29
Tellingly, the President spoke not only of the need for reform but
also “to build a new foundation for sustained economic growth”
and to “put in place rules that will allow our markets to promote
innovation” resulting in “new jobs and new businesses.”30
Once the initial panic passed, and the financial sector
became largely stabilized, the political focus turned to job
creation. Between December 2007 and April 2009, 5.1 million
Americans lost their jobs, and the national unemployment rate
soared to 8.5%.31 Despite rebounding corporate profits and
economic growth, the job market failed to recover.32 One cause
news/essays/21600451-finance-not-merely-prone-crises-it-shaped-them-five-historical-
crises-show-how-aspects-today-s-fina [https://perma.cc/LMN6-NMVK].
25 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 13 (describing fiscal
stimulus and regulatory reforms that quickly followed the initial crisis, including a tax-
payer funded bailout and the Basel committee reforms).
26 Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great
Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps Are Not Taken, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090213005161/en/Top-Economists-Agree-2009-
Worst-Financial-Crisis [https://perma.cc/W22Y-7FNV] (quoting Kenneth Rogoff, former
chief economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)).
27 See id.
28 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks of the President on Regulatory
Reform (June 17, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-regulatory-reform/ [https://perma.cc/6NEU-5BBX].
29 Id.
30 See id.
31 See IMF, CRISIS AND RECOVERY, supra note 12, at 63.
32 See Myles Udland, The Number of Jobs Created During This Recovery Is
Either a Lot or Not That Many, Depending on How You Look at It, BUS. INSIDER (June
1, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/jobs-created-during-the-recovery-2015-6 [https://
perma.cc/CBC5-9BQA]; see also Current Employment Statistics—CES (National): CES
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was the high cost of capital, which slowed economic activity and
inhibited growth.33 Cost of capital refers to the cost of raising
money.34 One way corporations can raise the money needed to
fund ongoing activities or expansion is to sell or issue shares of
stock. This provides access to capital but at the cost of equity in
the company.35 As post-collapse stock prices fell, companies were
forced to sell more shares per dollar raised, making capital
raising through share issuance less attractive.36 Against this
backdrop, and despite the government’s efforts to inject liquidity
into capital markets, “new securities issues came to a virtual
stop.”37 During this time, job creation was largely stagnant.38 In
2011, at the Thirtieth Annual Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation (the Forum), the SEC identified increased liquidity as
one of three key components of any plan to address economic
weakness.39 The Forum’s recommendations are reflected in the
JOBS Act. By this time, the government’s focus had shifted from
stabilizing the economy and preventing future crises to
promoting economic growth.40 The law, which sought to increase
employment by supporting emerging growth companies, passed
Peak-Trough Tables, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/ces/cespeak
trough.htm [https://perma.cc/VR3R-6MGK] (last updated Dec. 10, 2012) (showing
seasonally adjusted employment peaking in January 2008 only to fall for thirty-seven
consecutive months, finally bottoming out in February 2011).
33 See IMF, CRISIS AND RECOVERY, supra note 12, at 63 (“Despite large cuts
in policy interest rates, credit is exceptionally costly or hard to get for many households
and firms . . . . [which has] elevated uncertainty about job security . . . .”).
34 See Brenda M. Clarke & Ronald L. Seigneur, Definition of Cost of Capital,
in VALUING PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES & LICENSES § 11.02 (William F. Murray ed., 4th
ed. Supp. 2016). This is often reflective of the required rate of return to attract
investment. While the transaction costs associated with raising capital are usually not
included, in the context of this note they take on primary importance.
35 See Brenda M. Clarke & Ronald L. Seigneur, Correlation Between Risk and
Cost of Capital, in VALUINGPROFESSIONALPRACTICES&LICENSES, supra note 34, § 11.03.
36 See IMF, CRISIS AND RECOVERY, supra note 12, at 2–3, 63; Davin Chor &
Kalina Manova, Off the Cliff and Back? Credit Conditions and International Trade
During the Global Financial Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16174, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16174.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT4Z-T7YS].
37 See IMF, CRISIS AND RECOVERY, supra note 12, at 3–4.
38 See id. at 3–4 & fig.1.4.
39 See id. at 39 (“There are three key elements of a strategy to restore financial
institutions to health: (1) ensuring that financial institutions have access to liquidity, (2)
identifying and dealing with distressed assets, and (3) recapitalizing weak but viable
institutions.”).
40 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Nav
Athwal, Does the JOBS Act of 2012 Work in the Economic, Investor, and Tech Climate
of 2016?,, FORBES (May 5, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/navathwal/2016/05/05/
does-the-jobs-act-of-2012-work-in-the-economic-investor-and-tech-climate-of-2016/#3ccf
69fb563f (“When the JOBS Act was first proposed . . . . [u]nemployment was at 8.2
percent, home prices had just hit a nine-year low and the Dow Jones industrial average
was fighting to hold steady . . . . In the midst of this turmoil, the JOBS Act was
designed to be the remedy.”).
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with “overwhelming bipartisan support.”41 Sadly, the law’s focus
was never as narrow, or focused, as its name might suggest. In
the case of Regulation A-Plus, this overbroad and unfocused
approach undermined the intent of Congress.
The intent of the JOBS Act appears evident on its face.
The title of the law is the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act: “An Act [t]o increase American job creation and economic
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for
emerging growth companies.”42 However, the legislative history
of the Act shows a tension between supporting small companies
and emerging growth companies.43 The JOBS Act was not
originally conceived of as a single unified bill, but rather was an
amalgamation of several bills that had been enacted by the
House before stalling in the Senate.44 During debate, lawmakers
commented that “small businesses and entrepreneurs cannot
access the capital they need to grow and create jobs,” echoing
statements made by industry leaders before the Subcommittee
on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises in
March of 2011.45 When the President signed the bill into law, the
accompanying press release described the Act as “provid[ing] for
Federal securities law exemptions intended to ease access to
capital and investments for emerging growth companies.”46 The
Act contains several key provisions including: (1) an IPO on-
ramp for emerging growth companies,47 (2) relaxation of the
rules prohibiting general solicitation and advertising in relation
to certain offerings,48 and (3) the creation of Regulation A-Plus.49
41 See Eric Hammesfahr, House Panel to Examine SEC’s Finance Division,
CQ ROLL CALL, July 22, 2014, 2014 WL 3587773 (quoting House Panel Chairman Scott
Garrett).
42 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. at 306.
43 Under both the Exchange Act and the JOBS Act, smaller reporting
companies and emerging growth companies have different definitions based on annual
revenue. Similarly, they are subject to different reporting requirements and distinct
regulatory schemes. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(19), 77c(b)(1) (2012); see also Comparing
Emerging Growth Company vs. Smaller Reporting Company, LEXISNEXIS, https://
advance.lexis.com (last updated Jan. 7, 2017); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
Frequently Asked Questions: Generally Applicable Questions on Title I of the JOBS Act, SEC
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjjobsactfaq-title-i-general.
htm [https://perma.cc/N4JF-AKSM].
44 Pete Kasperowicz, Cantor Says JOBS Bill Set for House Passage Next Week,
THE HILL (Mar. 1, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/213613-cantor-says-
jobs-bill-set-for-house-passage-next-week [https://perma.cc/FW8M-TM7M].
45 H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 3 (2011).
46 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Statement by the
Press Secretary on H.R. 3606 (Apr. 5, 2012), 2012 WL 1133728.
47 See Bonnie J. Roe, IPO On-Ramp: The Emerging Growth Company, AM.
BAR ASS’N: BUS. L. TODAY http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2012/05/04_
roe.html [https://perma.cc/AX4F-DCV7].
48 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a) 126
Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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The original Regulation A, which long predated the JOBS
Act, addressed the capital needs of small businesses.50 As
discussed, however, the JOBS Act focused primarily on emerging
growth companies and startups. The original draft of the JOBS
Act did not contain Title IV or Regulation A-Plus.51 Added after
debate had commenced, Title IV would be shaped by the
legislation into which it was inserted. While revisions to
Regulation A were originally envisioned from a small business
perspective, Regulation A’s inclusion in an act targeting startups
and emerging growth companies—distinct classes of companies
with unique needs—resulted in a one-size-fits-all Regulation A-
Plus. This revision departed from the original Regulation A in
many key respects.
This lack of focus is reflected in the comments of the
Regulation’s creators. While the President referenced emerging
growth companies,52 members of Congress and representatives for
the business community discussed small firms.53 Unfortunately,
these two distinct classes of business have unique needs and face
their own unique problems. The Act defines an emerging growth
company as “an issuer that had total annual gross revenues of
less than $1,000,000,000 . . . during its most recently completed
fiscal year.”54 By contrast, small companies are typically defined
as those having fewer than 500 employees for manufacturing
businesses or less than “$7.5 million in average annual receipts
for many nonmanufacturing industries.”55 According to the Small
Business Administration, small businesses were responsible for
49 See Thaya Brook Knight, A Walk Through the JOBS Act of 2012:
Deregulation in the Wake of Financial Crisis, POL’Y ANALYSIS, May 3, 2016, at 1, https://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa790.pdf [https://perma.cc/W49E-TNJL].
50 It is worth noting that Regulation A was adopted specifically and solely for the
purpose of helping small, not emerging growth, companies. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN
REGULATIONAOFFERINGS 5 (2012) (“SEC has previously stated that the primary purpose in
adopting Regulation A was to provide a simple and relatively inexpensive procedure for
small business use in raising limited amounts of needed capital.”).
51 Compare Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. at 306, with H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2011).
52 See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, supra note 46.
53 See Jamie Farrell, The JOBS Act: What Startups and Small Businesses Need
to Know, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2012/09/
21/the-jobs-act-what-startups-and-small-businesses-need-to-know-infographic (“The JOBS
Act is designed to encourage small business and startup funding by easing federal
regulations and allowing individuals to become investors.”); see also Brief for Respondent,
Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-1149, 15-1150), 2015 WL 5676882,
at *1–2 (in which the SEC stated that Regulation A-Plus was “intended to help small
businesses obtain access to the capital markets”).
54 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(19) (2012).
55 See Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sector, U.S. SMALL BUS.
ADMIN. (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.sba.gov/content/summary-size-standards-industry-
sector [https://perma.cc/G6MF-FDVC].
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63.3% of all new jobs created between the third quarter of 1992
and the third quarter of 2013.56 Other estimates put the figure at
as high as 80%.57 Most of this has been driven by small business
expansion and growth, which depends on access to capital.58
Generally, small businesses have a harder time raising capital
than emerging growth companies, but also require smaller
amounts of capital per raise.59 Because the Act and its resultant
Regulation seek to help both classes of companies, it fails to
effectively help either.
B. The Failure of Regulation A
Several mechanisms are available to companies seeking
to raise capital, such as issuing equity in the form of stock.60
Under current regulations, any new issuance of stock must be
registered with the SEC.61 This is often a very complicated and
expensive process, which may be inappropriate for smaller
companies with fewer resources and smaller capital needs.62
Several exemptions to the registration requirement exist.63 One
exemption is found in Regulation A. Regulation A, authorized
under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, was not
eliminated by the JOBS Act. Instead, the Act preserved Section
3(b), now Section 3(b)(1), and added Regulation A-Plus as 3(b)(2).64
Section (3)(b)(1) authorizes the SEC to “add any class of
securities to the securities exempted” from registration but caps
the size of such issues at $5 million.65 The SEC promulgated this
exemption as Regulation A. Though exempt from full-blown
registration, companies that issue shares to the public under
Regulation A are still required to jump numerous regulatory
hurdles. Under the current structure, Regulation A-Plus, while
deemed an exemption, requires companies to provide a host of
56 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADVOCACY, FREQUENTLY ASKEDQUESTIONS
1 (2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D83N-W3LF].
57 See SEC, 2011 SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS
CAPITAL FORMATION FINAL REPORT 11 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/
gbfor30.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7ZS-TSG5].
58 See Aguilar, supra note 1.
59 See id.
60 See generally TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 16:13 (James D.
Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen eds., 3d ed. 2016).
61 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2012); see also SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., CAPITAL RAISING
IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS,
2009–2014, at 3 (2015).
62 See id.
63 Id.
64 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2012).
65 Id. § 77c(b)(1).
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documents more often associated with registered offerings.66 The
company must file a Form 1-A offering statement for review and
approval by the SEC.67 This form, containing twenty-nine pages
of questions and often requiring supplemental documentation
and disclosures, is often met with requests for amendment or
additional information by the SEC. In addition to this form, the
company is required to distribute an offering circular to
investors.68 Once a share issuance is approved, sales are still
limited to “qualified purchasers,”69 who are viewed as more
sophisticated.70 Companies who issue shares under this rule are
required to meet periodic reporting requirements in the form of
annual audited statements.71
Even after these requirements have been satisfied,
companies must still comply with state blue sky laws. State blue
sky laws require companies to register stock with a state regulator
before selling to any investors residing within the state.72 All states
require a qualification review, similar to that employed at the
federal level. As a result, issuers may have to submit variations
on the same paperwork multiple times to multiple regulatory
bodies. A majority of states also conduct a merit review—a
review of the “offering’s fundamental fairness to investors.”73
Under the merit review process, states can invalidate a
registration for any number of reasons including perceived unfair
pricing or unreasonable risk expectations—regardless of whether
these facts are disclosed.74 The length of time a company must
66 “[U]nder the new Regulation A-Plus rules, companies are required to file
with the SEC Regulation A-Plus offering statements consisting of basic business
information, risk factors, plans of distribution, use of proceeds, liquidity and capital
resources, results of operations, executive compensation, related-party transactions,
and descriptions of the securities being offered.” Rebecca G. DiStefano, Reg D Versus
Reg A-Plus, and How to Prepare for Offerings, LAW360 (June 2, 2015), http://www.law
360.com/articles/662162/reg-d-versus-reg-a-plus-and-how-to-prepare-for-offerings [https://
perma.cc/9YG2-JZ4G]. This is in addition to the balance sheets and other financial
information, which must be audited for Tier 2 issuers, that must be provided for the
previous two years. Id.
67 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1) (historical as of 2011).
68 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.253 (2016). Prior to 1992, an offering circular was not
required for smaller issuances. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small
Businesses’ Search for “A Moderate Capital”, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 101 (2006). This
change is one reason that Rule 504, another exemption which does not require an
offering circular, “became more attractive . . . for small public offerings.” Id.
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1), (b)(3) (2012).
70 See PETER M. FASS & DEREK A. WITTNER, BLUE SKY PRACTICE FOR PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OFFERINGS § 2:61 (2015).
71 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b) (2016).
72 See UNIF. SEC. ACT, § 301 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ONUNIF. STATE
LAWS 2005).
73 Rick A. Fleming, 100 Years of Securities Law: Examining a Foundation
Laid in the Kansas Blue Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 586 n.21 (2011).
74 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 50, at 8, 13–14.
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wait before it can finally issue shares is often increased as the
issuer struggles to comply with a host of state laws.75
Despite these hurdles, Regulation A enjoyed some initial
success. From 1992 to 1997, following a revision to the rules
which increased the size of potential raises from $1.5 million to
its current $5 million and added a “test the waters” provision,76
the number of companies that filed initial Regulation A
paperwork rose from 15 per year to 116 per year.77 However,
following the rise in popularity of Regulation D,78 the numbers
began to fall.79 There were only 8 Regulation A offerings in 2008,
3 in 2009, and only 1 in 2011.80 As reliance on Regulation A
declined more companies began using Regulation D, which by
2014 produced over 33,000 offerings and added $1.4 trillion to
the capital markets.81 This suggests that Regulation D, not a
decline in capital raises generally, caused the decline in
Regulation A’s popularity.
The popularity of Regulation D was not the sole cause of
Regulation A’s failure. Some commentators argue that the $5
million ceiling is too low to justify the costly filing process.82
This claim is somewhat suspect. Compared to their relative
size, $5 million is a reasonably large amount of money for most
small companies. Additionally, between 2002 and 2011, only a
third of all Regulation A filings sought to raise $5 million, with
the remaining two-thirds never intending to reach this
ceiling.83 This suggests that there is an active market for
75 See Corporation Finance Staffers Detail Rulemaking Progress, WARREN
GORHAM & LAMONT ACCT. & COMPLIANCE ALERT, Dec. 10, 2013 (“Reg A offerings have not
been popular largely because, according to [senior special counsel at the SEC] Yu, ‘without
state law preemption, the offering exemption is not very usable for many companies.’”).
76 The “test the waters” provision permits companies to make informal offers
to investors before filing with the SEC, gauging market interest before starting the
Regulation A process. See Campbell, supra note 68, at 101.
77 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 50, at 8.
78 See 17 C.F.R. 230.506(d) (2016).
79 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 50, at 9. Like Regulation A,
Regulation D was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Securities Act
of 1933. Pursuant to Rule 504 of Regulation D, companies can sell up to $1 million of
stock by filing a Form D, which only requires cursory information about the company’s
“promoters, executive officers and directors, and some details about the offering” but not
the extensive company specific information required for a Form 1-A. See Regulation D
Offerings, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/answers/regd.htm [https://perma.cc/25GM-9VEZ]
(last updated Oct. 28, 2014).
80 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 50, at 11 tbl.1.
81 See BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 61, at 2.
82 See STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL & EMERGING
COMPANIES § 9:1 (2016) (“For most of its history, Regulation A has been more than a scarlet
letter, it has been a dead letter. The relatively low ceiling for permissible offerings . . . led
counsel and companies to select other exemptions . . . .”).
83 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 50, at 9–10.
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smaller capital raisings and that the source of Regulation A’s
failure lies elsewhere.
A second, and more satisfying, explanation is that
Regulation A filings are too costly and time consuming, especially
when compared to Regulation D.84 As previously noted, companies
seeking to use Regulation A must file a Form 1-A with the SEC,
submit to multiple rounds of comments and amendments, create
and distribute an offering circular, and comply with any
additional requirements imposed by state blue sky laws.85 This
process is not only costly but also time consuming. On average, it
takes 228 days for a company to get final approval of its Form 1-
A.86 For cash-strapped companies looking to take advantage of
current opportunities, this is not an attractive option.87
C. An Attempt at Reform: Creating Regulation A-Plus
Congress and the SEC were well aware of these
concerns when they drafted Regulation A-Plus. The revised law
seeks to address these flaws in several ways. Regulation A-Plus
raised the offering limit to $50 million in any twelve-month
period.88 The regulation is divided into two funding tiers: Tier
1, encompassing capital raises under $20 million, and Tier 2,
encompassing raises between $20 million and $50 million.89
Both tiers allow general solicitation90 and the use of online
crowd-funding platforms.91 Additionally, both now allow the sale
of securities to “qualified investors,” a less stringent definition
than “accredited investors,”92 although such purchases are
limited to a relatively small percent of sales.93 Tier 2 raises are
exempt from state blue sky laws, although Tier 1 raises must
84 See THEODORE S. LYNN ET AL., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
§ 12:28 (2015).
85 See supra at pp. 1015–1016.
86 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 50, at 12.
87 See id. (finding that 21% of companies that sought approval for a Regulation
A offering ultimately withdrew or otherwise abandoned their filings).
88 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2016).
89 See id. § 230.251(a).
90 See id. § 230.255; see also LYNN ET AL., supra note 84, § 12:28 (noting that
issuers are still permitted to “test the waters” through solicitations of interest before
incurring the costs associated with filing).
91 See Sherwood Neiss, With the New Reg A+, What Type of Crowd
Fundraising Is Right for Your Startup?, VB (Mar. 25, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/
2015/03/25/with-the-new-reg-a-what-type-of-fundraising-is-right-for-your-startup [https://
perma.cc/E5P9-TFUP].
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(3) (2012).
93 See Press Release, SEC, New Rules Provide Investors with More Investment
Choices (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html [https://
perma.cc/4K7C-XYKA].
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still comply with state laws.94 Additionally, while both tiers must
submit financial statements, only Tier 2 requires audited
financials.95 This reduces costs for the smaller Tier 1 raises.
Finally, all raises will still undergo review and potentially
comment from the SEC.96
Once the relevant requirements are satisfied, issuers can
sell unrestricted securities to the public but must file annual
audited financial statements and make periodic disclosures.97
The principle differences between Regulation A and Regulation
A-Plus, aside from the increased funding limit, are the
preemption of state securities laws98 and the right to sell to a
larger number of nonaccredited investors.99 These changes
purportedly make Regulation A-Plus more attractive to small and
emerging growth companies by streamlining the filing process
and reducing both the aggregate cost of capital, thanks to
reduced requirements, and the average cost of capital, due to
the increased ceiling on raises. It seems unlikely, however, that
Regulation A-Plus will benefit either category of company, as
discussed in the following sections.
D. Placing Regulation A-Plus in the Larger Regulatory
Landscape
In order to fully understand the failure of Regulation A-
Plus, it is not only important to understand which companies the
Act sought to help, but also why help was needed. As previously
discussed, the financial crisis created a lack of liquidity that in
turn prevented business growth.100 Title IV of the JOBS Act and
the resulting Regulation A-Plus attempt to direct capital to small
and emerging growth companies.101 However, they are not the
only capital raising mechanisms available. Initial Public Offerings
(IPOs) and other Direct Public Offerings (DPOs), such as
Regulation D, have traditionally provided access to capital.
Regulation A-Plus, while often viewed as a DPO, might
94 Id.
95 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252, 230.257 (2016).
96 See Neiss, supra note 91.
97 See LYNN ET AL., supra note 84, § 12:28.
98 See Press Release, SEC, supra note 93.
99 See Amy Wan, A Comparison of Reg CF and Reg A-Plus, LAW360 (Mar.
14, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/901763/a-comparison-of-reg-cf-and-reg-a-plus
[https://perma.cc/Q5ZZ-JVWB].
100 See IMF, CRISIS AND RECOVERY, supra note 12, at 6–7, 32–38.
101 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, tit. IV, 126
Stat. 306, 323–25 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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ultimately rest in a gap between these other options.102 It is
more affordable than a traditional IPO, and as such can be
used by smaller companies, but shares issued via Regulation A-
Plus are unrestricted and can be sold in a secondary market.103
For public companies, the result is a mechanism that costs less
than an IPO while offering greater liquidity than other DPOs.
For private companies, the ability to sell directly into a
secondary market offers a path to publicly traded status without
complying with the usual formalities.104
Because companies may view this as an alternative to a
formal IPO, it is worth examining the traditional IPO process.
IPOs play an important role in capital formation. The ability of a
corporation to transform into a publicly traded entity has serious
implications for its ability to raise funds, although too often
alternative paths are overlooked because of the reputation of the
IPO.105 There are four generally accepted reasons for going
public: (1) to minimize the cost of capital, (2) to provide an exit
for existing investors, (3) to attract potential mergers or
takeovers, and (4) to increase public awareness and reputation.106
The drafters of the JOBS Act sought to promote the first of these
reasons by creating an IPO On-Ramp for Emerging Growth
Companies.107 However, because shares sold under Regulation
A-Plus may subsequently be traded on an over-the-counter
exchange, companies utilizing the exemption may seek to benefit
102 SeeMy Say, How to Go Public Without Middlemen: Top 2 Options, FORBES
(Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/01/09/how-to-go-public-
without-middlemen-top-2-options/#6890828f2ab5.
103 See Luis A. Aguilar, The Need for Greater Secondary Market Liquidity for
Small Businesses, SEC (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/need-for-
greater-secondary-market-liquidity-for-small-businesses.html [https://perma.cc/4S48-X4
WC]; David Rodman, Note, Regulation A+, the JOBS Act, and Public Offering Lite, 90
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 99–100 (2013).
104 See Samuel S. Guzik, Regulation A+ Offerings—a New Era at the SEC,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE& FIN. REG. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2014/01/15/regulation-a-offerings-a-new-era-at-the-sec [https://perma.cc/6B7
U-AXBY].
105 See David T. Shaheen, Public Without an IPO—Strategies and
Considerations, BURK & REEDY, LLP, http://www.burkreedy.com/publications/DavidT
Shaheen/Public%20Without%20an%20IPO%20-%20Strategies%20and%20Alternatives.
pdf [https://perma.cc/SD8D-49XH].
106 See James C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An
Analysis of Theory and Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399, 405–06 (2006).
107 See Alexander F. Cohen et al., JOBS Act Establishes IPO On-Ramp,
CLIENT ALERT, Mar. 27, 2012, at 1, https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub47
11_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M5K-Z3CR]. Title I of the JOBS Act permits Emerging
Growth Companies to become publicly traded without committing to the full IPO process.
Id. Companies which meet the statutory definition of emerging growth company will
require “only two, rather than three, years of audited financial statements to go public”
and will enjoy several other key exceptions for one to five years after they initially file. Id.
This new mechanism is been dubbed the IPO On-Ramp. See id.
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from any of the four. This is arguably a benefit of Regulation A-
Plus. However, there is good reason to question whether this
alternative use will result in more capital raising or simply
change the form of capital raising, resulting in less regulation
without increasing total volume.108
II. WHAT REGULATION A-PLUSGETS RIGHT
A. Preemption of State Blue Sky Laws
Before turning to Regulation A-Plus’s many shortcomings
and failures, some credit should be given to its drafters. The
decision to preempt state blue sky laws, while insufficient to
make Regulation A-Plus a success, is an important step and
should be expanded to other areas of securities regulation.
Securities sold pursuant to Regulation A-Plus, must be “covered
securities.”109 As such, they are exempt from state registration,
provided they are either sold on a national securities exchange
or to a qualified purchaser.110
State blue sky laws, so called because they attempt to offer
protection from “speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of ‘blue sky,’”111 predate federal securities
regulation.112 Massachusetts passed its first law restricting the
sale of securities in railroad companies in 1852.113 The first true
blue sky law was enacted in Kansas in 1911, with most other
states following suit shortly thereafter.114 As discussed above,
state blue sky laws add an additional—and often costly—step
in the registration process.115
While the actual content of state blue sky laws may vary,
forty states have adopted, with minor variation, laws based on the
North American Securities Administrators Association Uniform
Securities Act. The Uniform Securities Act requires a registration
statement, which must be accompanied by (1) a statement of
eligibility, (2) background information on the issuer, (3) a
description of the security, and (4) a prospectus.116 As an
108 See infra Section III.B.
109 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012) (defining covered securities to include those
exempt from registration under 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2), authorizing Regulation A-Plus).
110 See id.
111 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
112 SeeWhite & Palid, supra note 5, at 118.
113 Id.
114 See Opening Brief of Petitioners at 5, Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-1149, 15-1150); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of
the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 348, 359–61 (1991).
115 See supra Section I.B.
116 Id.
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alternative, if a registration statement has been filed with the
SEC, the Uniform Securities Act permits registration by
coordination of the applications.117 Coordination “streamlines the
content . . . and the procedure by which a registration statement
becomes effective, but not the substantive standards governing
the . . . registration statement.”118 This has reduced, but not
eliminated, the costs of compliance with state blue sky laws.
Due to the extra cost and time associated with compliance,
many commentators have argued that state blue sky laws
unnecessarily inhibit capital formation.119 Preemption of state
blue sky laws was one of the recommendations of the SEC’s
Thirtieth Annual Forum on Small Business Capital Formation,
held in 2011.120 At the forum, the SEC reaffirmed its
commitment to protecting investors but still recommended
preempting state law.121
Many state regulators have objected to the preemption
of state blue sky laws, with Montana and Massachusetts going
so far as to challenge Regulation A-Plus in court.122 In their
brief to the court, Montana and Massachusetts argued that
preemption would “put[ ] vulnerable investors at unacceptable
risk. . . . disrupt[ing] the nation’s longstanding system of dual
regulatory enforcement.”123
For certain Regulation A[-Plus] offerings up to $50 million in size,
which are exempt from federal protection, the rule leaves investors
exposed to the risk of fraud by broadly preempting state securities
registration and qualification requirements. The states, which have
reviewed securities offerings far longer than the federal government,
are now barred from performing this essential role, even for offerings
that are substantially sold in local-area markets.124
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts William F.
Galvin, in comments regarding Regulation A-Plus, said
“[b]ecause many Regulation A-Plus offerings will be made by
small and early-stage issuers, they will involve significant
risks . . . . It is crucial not to sacrifice the protection of small
117 Id.; see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2005).
118 Id. § 303 cmt. 1.
119 See Roberta S. Karmel, Blue Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or
Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (1987).
120 See SEC, supra note 57, at 30.
121 Id. at 15, 30.
122 See Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 648 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
123 Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 114, at 1, 46–47; see also SEC
Backs Its New Capital-Raising Rule in Appeals Court Filing Lindeen v. SEC, 21
WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 10, Oct. 22, 2015, at *2.
124 Opening Brief for Petitioners, supra note 114, at 1.
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investors in pursuit of regulatory speed and convenience.”125
Secretary Galvin went on to note that “lower-tier over-the-
counter markets for stocks . . . are the biggest source of
complaints about fraud,” and that “abusive investor practices
[might] gravitate to Regulation A-Plus offerings instead.”126 To
bolster these claims, state regulators have pointed to prior
attempts at reducing requirements for small offerings. One such
example is Rule 504, which deregulated certain small offerings
but, due to pervasive fraud, was revised only seven years later.127
The fear that preemption will lead to massive fraud is
misplaced. The SEC has recognized the threat of fraud and has
taken steps it feels will afford protection to investors.128 First,
while state blue sky laws have been preempted, state regulators
retain the power to investigate fraud and retroactively protect
local investors.129 Second, despite the arguments of state
regulators to the contrary, there are still substantial protections
afforded to local investors. Issuers must still disclose material
information, provide an offering statement and circular, and
receive SEC approval prior to issuance.130 These are not
insubstantial protections. Third, preempted offerings are only
available to “qualified investors” who have greater assets, are
limited in the percentage of assets they may invest, have more
investment experience, and are therefore better placed to
protect their interests than ordinary investors.131
If fraud and abuse increase dramatically, small
companies will come to be associated with a dirty market-place,
hampering their ability to raise capital.132 Such an outcome
125 William F. Gavin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues
Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (Dec. 18, 2013), 2013 WL 6842757,
at *1–2.
126 Eric Hammesfahr, Massachusetts Slams SEC’s Regulation A-Plus
Proposal, CQ ROLL CALL, Feb. 3, 2014, 2014 WL 377709.
127 See Amanda Maine, Commissioner Stein Addresses ABA Committee About
Recent SEC Initiatives, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N TODAY, Nov. 26, 2013, 2013 WL
11077286.
128 See Aguilar, supra note 1 (“[T]he challenge is to develop a system that
enables businesses to raise capital in a cost-effective way and, at the same time, provide
ways to benefit and protect investors. After all, without investors, there can be no capital
formation.”).
129 See LYNN ET AL., supra note 84, § 12:28.
130 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–53 (2016).
131 The states have argued that this will not be effective; “[b]y defining ‘qualified
purchaser’ to mean ‘any person’ to whom these securities are offered or sold, the
Commission disregarded the plain meaning of that term” and has failed to ensure only
savvy investors are exposed to increased risk. See Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, Lindeen v.
SEC, 825 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-1149, 15-1150).
132 See Matthew Garza, Commissioner Aguilar Focuses on JOBS Act in
Remarks to Hispanic Business Group, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N TODAY, May 23, 2013,
2013 WL 11078071.
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seems unlikely. SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar acknowledged
this concern and, while accepting the SEC’s important role in
facilitating capital formation, noted that the SEC “has no
stronger mission than the protection of investors.”133
It has also been argued that Regulation A-Plus will expose
investors to greater risk by opening the doors to “qualified
investors,” an easier definition to satisfy than the traditional
“institutionally accredited investors.” Regulation A-Plus will
permit smaller investors, who do not qualify as institutionally
accredited under the SEC’s guidelines, to participate.134 However,
this will not necessarily increase risk and is in keeping with a
larger trend toward open capital markets to smaller investors,
increasing the pool of available capital.135
Cleaning up the regulatory landscape by preempting state
blue sky laws, and in the process, reducing the cost of raising
money through stock issuances, represents one of Regulation A-
Plus’s rare successes.
B. Restrictions on General Solicitations
Traditionally, the SEC has imposed a ban on general
solicitation or advertising before approval of a private placement
or public offering.136 General solicitation and general advertising
occur when a company, prior to receiving SEC approval to sell
unrestricted shares of its stock, uses mass communication or
advertising to alert potential investors that the company is
pursuing investments.137 This can be an effective way of
attracting early investor attention and refining a corporate
advertising and soliciting strategy. This sort of soft open can be
very beneficial to issuers, but some have speculated that it will
133 Id.
134 “The Commission proposes to use its power to define ‘qualified purchaser’
under Section 18 of the Securities Act as a means to make Regulation A-Plus offerings
transactions in covered securities.” William F. Gavin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional
Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act (Dec. 18, 2013), 2013 WL
6842757, at *3.
135 For example, another key addition to the JOBS Act is the new Crowd
Funding provisions. See supra Section I.C.
136 See Eliminating the Prohibition on General Solicitation and General
Advertising in Certain Offerings, SEC (July 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2013/2013-124-item1.htm [https://perma.cc/62U4-R42S].
137 See Tanya Prive, General Solicitation Ban Lifted Today—Three Things You
Must Know About It, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/
2013/09/23/general-solicitation-ban-lifted-today-three-things-you-must-about-it/#3a358
29635a3 (General solicitation “includes . . . , but [is] not limited to: 1. A mass
newsletter/email[;] 2. A public profile on a startup investment platform[;] 3. A company,
personal or third-party website . . . [;] 4. Public speaking engagements.”).
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harm investors by permitting the dissemination of unverified
and inaccurate information.138
Long banned by the Securities Act of 1933, general
solicitation is now available under Title II of the JOBS Act
which relaxes the ban in several contexts, including Regulation
A-Plus.139 To benefit from this change, companies must file
advertising and solicitation material with the SEC.140 It is
currently unclear how much control the SEC intends to exert
over the content of this material. In most instances, the ban
will only be lifted with regard to accredited investors, however
in the context of Regulation A-Plus, it will be lifted for sales to
qualified investors, a broader category.141
In addition, Regulation A-Plus contains a “test the
waters” provision.142 This provision lets companies approach
investors to gauge interest even before they file initial
paperwork with the SEC.143 This is a valuable change in the
law, which may make Regulation A-Plus a more attractive
option to companies. By permitting companies to solicit interest
in their securities before filing, companies will be able to
reduce the total time lapse between the decision to issue and
the actual sale of securities. The long delays in approval and
ultimate sale were a major reason for the failure of the original
Regulation A.144 Additionally, companies may be less likely to
withdraw their filings if they can accurately predict and
anticipate the course of the intended capital raise.
Nonetheless, there is room for further improvement.
The rules regarding general solicitation are not completely clear
and may be limiting. First, it is unclear how much control the
SEC will exercise over advertising material, although it is clear
they will receive copies of all advertising materials.145 Second,
138 Ryan Caldbeck, What Is General Solicitation, and Why Does It Matter to
You, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2013/10/28/
what-is-general-solicitation-and-why-it-matters-to-you/#37136c5375f8 (General solicitation,
when used right, “will . . . allow[ ] entrepreneurs to raise capital more efficiently so they can
get back to their day job of building their business.”).
139 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, tit. 2,
§ 201, 126 Stat. 306, 313–15 (2012) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 77d); see also Eliminating
the Prohibition on General Solicitation and General Advertising in Certain Offerings,
supra note 136 (noting the shifting regulatory landscape).
140 See DiSefano, supra note 66.
141 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2016).
142 See DiStefano, supra note 66; Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(b)(2)(E) (2012).
143 See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(E) (2012); see also DiSefano, supra note 66
(“Companies can ‘test the waters’ in Regulation A-Plus offerings prior to filing the
required offering statements. Sales literature is also permitted.”).
144 See supra Section I.B.
145 See DiSefano, supra note 66.
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any statements made during this period will be subject to
traditional antifraud provisions,146 but it is unclear if companies
will be able to cure errors before the actual sale.147 Finally, there
are certain provisions—such as the ban on sale to nonqualified
investors—which are not clearly articulated or widely known.148
This ambiguity may cause problems, especially since failure to
abide by the Regulations carries a one-year fundraising ban.149
Additionally, companies that engage in general solicitation
or advertising will be limited to Tier 2 offerings.150 Smaller
companies, already disadvantaged by the current structure of the
rule, are less likely to have the need or ability to pursue such
large capital raises and therefore will not benefit from the “test
the waters” provision.151 Another concern is that use of the “test
the waters” provision may expose companies to liability if they
later decide to utilize a capital raising mechanism that does not
permit solicitation. By expanding this provision to all Regulation
A-Plus offerings and assuring companies they will not accidentally
run afoul of the law, the SEC can both reduce the cost of capital
and give companies the tools they need to assess the potential costs
and gains of issuing shares.
III. MAKING REGULATION A-PLUSWORK
Regulation A-Plus’s one-size-fits-all approach fails to
help either small businesses or emerging growth companies.
This part considers the funding needs of each type of company,
as well as the ways in which Regulation A-Plus fails to meet
those needs and how the rule could be improved.
A. Regulation A-Plus and Small Companies
Among the many criticisms leveled against Regulation
A, the most consistent was that the rule was prohibitively
costly and time consuming. Thus, Regulation A-Plus was
146 See Michael Raneri, Testing the Waters and Filing a Regulation A+
Offering with the SEC, FORBES (May 26, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mraneri/
2015/05/26/testing-the-waters-and-filing-a-regulation-a-offering-with-the-sec.
147 Some regulators have expressed concern that companies will be able to file
false or misleading information, which will be used to generate excitement among regular
investors, only to correct the information at the last minute when investors are unlikely
to reread information they believe they already possess.
148 See Prive, supra note 137 (“In nine out of ten conversations with
startups . . . entrepreneurs were not aware of what it means to generally solicit or the
implications tied to doing so set forth by the [SEC].”).
149 Id.
150 See Regulation A+ and Testing the Waters, CROWDCHECK BLOG, http://www.
crowdcheck.com/blog/regulation-and-testing-waters [https://perma.cc/2ZC6-MUPY].
151 See infra Section III.A.
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crafted with the expectation that reduced cost would prompt
increased use.152 The total cost reductions associated with
Regulation A-Plus, however, are minimal at best.153 Instead of
seeking to reduce total cost, the SEC attempted to solve the
problem by reducing the average cost of capital. This is because
companies, formerly restricted to $5 million per twelve-month
period, are now permitted to raise as much as $50 million without
increasing application time or expense.154 As a result, total cost,
reflected in time and expense, will be unaffected but average cost
will decrease. Unfortunately, this will provide little benefit to
truly small issuers, who typically raise far less than $1 million
in annual equity financing.155
The reduction in the average cost of capital afforded by
the increased fundraising limit may be attractive to companies
above a certain size, as discussed in Section III.B. Based on the
foregoing analysis, however, it seems unlikely that true small
companies, of the sort Regulation A-Plus should target, will
pursue raises over $5 million. Companies with less than $1
million in assets will be unable to raise $5 million in investments.
Even if they could attract such interest, the amount of equity
required appears prohibitive. This leads to the conclusion that
such companies will receive no cost savings and will likely
continue to avoid Regulation A-Plus.
Rather than increasing the total capital limit associated
with Regulation A, the SEC should expand efforts to reduce
aggregate, rather than average, cost of capital while
simultaneously reducing the period between initial filing and
initial sale. Regulation A-Plus has begun this process by
preempting state blue sky laws. It could further advance this
goal, and in so doing increase small business access to capital,
by streamlining the registration process at the federal level by
152 See Commissioner Aguilar Focuses on JOBS Act in Remarks to Hispanic
Business Group, FED. SEC. L. REP., May 29, 2013, at 5, 6 (SEC Commissioner Aguilar
predicts “companies will benefit from having less expensive methods to raise capital.”).
153 See Mary Jo White, Chair of SEC, Remarks at SEC Open Meeting (Dec. 18,
2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2013-12-18-open-meeting-mjw [https://
perma.cc/Q8UD-A23U] (“To ensure that the revised exemption will be a viable path for
capital-raising, a calibrated preemption of state securities laws in connection with certain
Regulation A offerings currently appears necessary.”); see also Corporation Finance
Staffers Detail Rulemaking Progress, supra note 75 (“[W]ithout state law preemption, the
offering exemption is not very usable for many companies.” (quoting Ted Yu, Senior
Special Counsel at the SEC)).
154 See Hammesfahr, supra note 41 (“The Regulation A plus proposal would
allow companies to raise as much as $50 million in capital over 12 months . . . , a
change that industry participants say would greatly lessen the cost of offerings.”).
155 See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADVOCACY, SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2014), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2014_
Finance_FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8V6-794Y].
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adopting a simplified form and expanding current test-the-
waters solicitation provisions.
In addition to streamlining the filing and review process
and simplifying forms used by companies, the SEC should give
serious consideration to reducing the filing requirements, which
are in sharp contrast to the minimal requirements for most
other exemptions.156 While these additional requirements may
make sense in the context of a $50 million offering, that in some
cases may take the place of a traditional IPO, it is unnecessary
for smaller offerings of the sort most small companies are likely
to pursue.
Another tactic would be to expand and clarify the rules
on general solicitation so that companies can market and
negotiate the sale of securities prior to approval of the
registration statement. While no sales could be made prior to
approval, this step would ensure that sale transactions are
consummated almost immediately after registration. Regulation
A-Plus has already taken a tentative step in this direction by
easing restrictions on solicitation.157 Expanding this provision so
that it applies to all forms of solicitation on all raises conducted
under Regulation A-Plus will make the exemption even more
attractive. More importantly, it will attract capital from
nontraditional investors—new funding sources—and direct it to
companies that could not previously participate in the market.
Further clarifying the rules governing marketing material, with
an emphasis on granting corporations greater freedom of action,
will also help encourage companies to pursue capital raises.
Some parties, including state regulators, have speculated
that general solicitation will result in greater fraud and harm to
investors. This fear is predicated on the notion that firms will
submit overly optimistic initial registration statements and
offering circulars, which will then be distributed to investors.
Following SEC review, the company will be compelled to revise
these documents. However, by the time revised documents are
distributed to potential investors, they may have already
mentally committed themselves to the investment and may be
less likely to read the new material. There is some merit to this
argument. However, it ignores existing limitations designed to
prevent soliciting unsophisticated or unwary investors, who are
more likely to conduct proper diligence. Additionally, blatant
156 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144A(d), 230.502–03 (2016).
157 See LYNN ET AL., supra note 84, § 12:28 (noting that issuers are still permitted
to “test the waters” through solicitations of interest before incurring the costs associated
with filing).
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bait-and-switch tactics might expose unscrupulous issues to civil
liability. Ultimately, these risks are outweighed by the economic
benefits of general solicitation.
B. Regulation A-Plus and Emerging Growth Companies
Even for larger emerging growth companies, Regulation
A-Plus’s value is limited. Emerging growth companies may
benefit from reduced average cost of capital not available to small
businesses. In light of this, many commentators have speculated
that companies will opt to use Regulation A-Plus rather than
pursuing a more traditional IPO.158 If this prediction is true,
Regulation A-Plus may redirect capital raising efforts and in the
process dramatically change the capital raising landscape without
actually increasing the total amount raised annually.159
Redirecting capital raising activities will not accomplish the Act’s
core goal of increasing capital raising activities.
Further, this redirection may be actively harmful.
Notably, since the enactment of the JOBS Act, the number of
IPOs under $100 million has decreased.160 While this data
predates the formal adoption of Regulation A-Plus, it points to the
general effect of the Act itself. Georgetown Law School Professor
Donald Langevoort is among those who believe that by providing
a “safe harbor for small companies,” the Act is actually
“encouraging a private offer rather than pursuing an IPO.”161
Such a shift from IPOs to private offerings is undesirable from a
public policy standpoint. The growth of the capital markets and
the access to capital they afford publicly traded companies has
played a critical role in economic development.162 This expansion
is closely tied to public trust in the marketplace, and in this
respect, the SEC plays a crucial role in promoting investment
158 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 3 (2011) (“Since the SEC set the Regulation A
threshold at $5 million in 1992, issuers and market participants have pointed out that
the offering threshold has been too low to justify the costs of going public under
Regulation A.”); see also Rodman, supra note 103, at 99–100 (“Regulation A[-Plus] may
function less as a replacement for private placements and more as a substitute for public
offerings. . . . In other words, Reg[ulation] A[-Plus] may properly be characterized as
‘public offering lite.’”).
159 See After Nearly Two Years, JOBS Act’s Effects on Market Are Hard to
Measure, WARREN GORHAM & LAMONT ACCT. & COMPLIANCE ALERT, Dec. 30, 2013
(“[C]ompanies will have access to enough funds through Reg[ulation] A-Plus that some
offerings will overlap with the low end of the IPO market.”).
160 Id.
161 Amanda Maine, DC Bar Panelists Discuss JOBS Act Impact on Investors,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N TODAY, June 26, 2012, 2012 WL 12353686.
162 Luc Laeven, The Development of Local Capital Markets: Rationale and
Challenges 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. WP/14/234,
2014).
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and capital formation. The exhaustive IPO process is closely
linked to this trust.163 In many ways, being listed on a public
exchange is seen as a sign of a company’s worth.164 This is
contrasted with the less respected over-the-counter markets.165
The public trust may be eroded, to the detriment of both firms
and investors alike, by the diversion of companies away from
traditional IPOs toward Regulation A-Plus.
Alternatively, businesses seeking to use Regulation A-
Plus for its intended purpose—rather than as an abbreviated
IPO—may unexpectedly find themselves subject to SEC reporting
requirements. Companies with more than $10 million in assets
and shares held by either 2000 individuals or 500 individuals who
are not accredited investors are subject to the Securities and
Exchange Act, even if they have not conducted a registered
offering or listed their shares on a national exchange.166 Because
shares issued under Regulation A-Plus are not restricted, and
thus are available for resale, it will be impossible for issuers to
control or otherwise limit the number of shareholders. As a result,
companies may accidentally trigger these thresholds.167
The collective effect is that Regulation A-Plus
simultaneously risks being misapplied by companies seeking to
avoid the IPO process, reducing market confidence without
increasing access to capital, while simultaneously injury those
emerging growth companies that sought to use the mechanism for
its intended purpose.
CONCLUSION
Access to capital plays a crucial role in promoting both
economic growth and job creation. This is especially true for
small businesses, which account for a significant portion of new
job creation but often struggle to locate or access the funds
necessary for survival or growth. By enabling these companies
to access capital and to take advantage of growth opportunities,
the SEC can play an important role in promoting job creation.
The original Regulation A failed to accomplish this goal. The
JOBS Act and Regulation A-Plus are poised for a similar failure
163 See JASON DRAHO, THE IPO DECISION: WHY AND HOW COMPANIES GO
PUBLIC 165 (2004).
164 See 17 ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES, ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION
§ 62:4 (Robert S. Hunter ed., 4th ed. 2007).
165 See id.
166 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012).
167 See Richard A. Denmon & Carlos A. Mas, JOBS Act Eases Requirements for
Triggering SEC’s Exchange Act Registration, CARLTON FIELDS (June 15, 2012), http://www.
carltonfields.com/jobs-act-eases-requirements-triggering-secs-exchange-act-registration.
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because their focus has fallen on emerging growth companies,
which already have access to capital through numerous functional
mechanisms. Some aspects of this new legislation will likely
prove effective. These include the preemption of state blue sky
laws and the easing of restrictions on general solicitation.
These changes to the law do not do enough to reduce the
cost of capital for small business. Regulation A-Plus’s attempt to
reduce the average cost of capital by encouraging larger raises
will not benefit small business, who are incapable of attracting
such large investments, and may create undesired incentives for
emerging growth companies to bypass traditional and desirable
mechanisms such as IPOs. The capital raise limit should be
reduced to levels appropriate for small companies but low
enough to discourage use by larger emerging growth companies.
SEC should reduce existing review requirements and streamline
through universal standardized forms. Restrictions on investors
should be closely monitored and revised so as to allow the
largest number of market participants without unduly
increasing risk. By adopting these fundamental reforms and
focusing on the capital needs of small businesses, Regulation A-
Plus will be more likely to accomplish its goal of promoting
economic and job growth.
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